East Front News #18: Defence Spending Dispute Between Poland and Brussels; Cooperation of Polish and US Army Corps; Ukraine, North Korea and the Security Guarantees

Polish-EU Dispute on Defence Spending

Polish Finance Minister Andrzej Domański, quoted by Euractiv, stated that the European Commission confirmed Poland’s defence spending would not be excluded from the excessive deficit procedure. He added that Poland may consider issuing bonds for defence purposes under these circumstances. Poland sought exclusion from EU deficit rules, which it did not achieve to the extent requested. In the July decision to initiate this procedure for Poland, defene spending was listed as one of the „relevant factors” that could influence Poland’s deficit assessment. However, the assessment paints a „mixed” picture. „Taking these relevant factors into account does not change the conclusion that the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’s deficit criterion is not met,” the statement said.

It is difficult to predict the outcome of further discussions with the European Commission and their impact on Poland’s defence budget. Possible solutions include extending the „adjustment path” (the timeframe for achieving the target deficit) from 4 to 7 years, the Commission suggesting other spending areas for reduction or revenue-raising measures (e.g., welfare spending cuts, tax increases), or the EU procedure significantly slowing Poland’s military modernization. From this perspective, and considering the lack of political consensus on cuts in non-security spending areas, the actions initiated by the Commission are concerning. Although the impact may not be immediately felt, it could become more evident over several years. Additionally, most European countries have insufficient combat capabilities relative to NATO’s new force model requirements, particularly in the land domain and the air defence, areas where Polish modernization is most intense. This situation could increase the risk of inadequate deterrence against Russia, which Poland’s substantial defence spending aims to prevent.

Fundamental Cooperation between Polish 2nd Corps and US Army V Corps

In Krakow, the Polish 2nd Corps and the U.S. Army V Corps, working together daily on NATO’s eastern flank, considered the role of territorial defense in peacetime and large-scale combat operations. The U.S. Army V Corps Public Affairs reported V Corps and NATO Allies reconvened for the second Territorial Defense Forces Symposium. The event occurred on October 21-22, 2024, in Krakow, Poland, as previously reported on Defence24. The participants of the symposium, reported by V Corps, defined the roles and responsibilities of the Baltic states and other NATO countries during peacetime and large-scale combat operations (LSCO) that could take place in our part of Europe. In coordination with the 2nd Polish Corps, V Corps emphasized that the symposium was attended by over 100 military commanders and experts from NATO countries.

Such meetings of the highest commanders of both corps are a significant achievement. This allows them to understand each other and the threats while gaining knowledge about the space in which cooperation is necessary, both in training and potentially in combat. However, to have the complete picture, it is more than the discussions that show the degree of cooperation between the two corps. The critical role is played by moments when this is proven in the practice of exercises, and here, it is necessary to emphasize several experiences from the exercise strongly codenamed Avenger Triad 2024. Avenger Triad 2024 is widely commented on throughout NATO and in various contexts, from the exercising corps, including both national corps from Poland and the U.S., to a scale unknown since the Cold War. Let us add that commanders from V Corps strongly praised the participation of the 2nd Polish Corps in Avenger Triad 2024, which showed that our corps is ready to undertake the most difficult missions in cooperation with NATO allies.

Digitalisation Strategy of Poland – the First Cyber Document of Its Kind

On Monday, 28 October, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digitalisation publicly presented the draft State Defence Strategy to 2035. The document outlines cooperation across various administrative sectors, emphasizing international collaboration in cyber defence by engaging academia, civil society, and businesses. A key component of the strategy is the recognition of cyberspace and technology’s supportive role. The digital state must operate within legal bounds and actively support sectors where technology threatens jobs.

By 2035, the strategy aims for 85% of citizens to possess basic digital competencies, and from that year forward, Poland plans to allocate 5% of its GDP to digitalisation. Additional goals include the complete digitisation of document management and expanding the »mObywatel« programme. Minister Gawkowski, during the Strategy’s announcement, revealed that projected expenditure on state digitalisation by 2030 will reach PLN 100 billion. This emphasis on digitalisation and bolstering Poland’s cyber defence arises as cyber activities by Russia and Belarus increase; Poland faces 80,000 cyber incidents this year alone, doubling the 2023 count. These threats have spurred discussions on establishing a Cyber Defence Agency. Although the Strategy doesn’t explicitly propose this, it highlights the need for a „central institution responsible for national cyber defence.”

No Restrictions on North Koreans

Over the past month, a significant issue related to the war in Ukraine has been the potential involvement of North Korean soldiers supporting Russian forces. This scenario now seems likely. Ukrainian intelligence, along with allied nations, including South Korea, confirm this possibility. Pentagon Deputy Spokesperson Sabrina Singh stated that the United States will not restrict Kyiv’s use of weapons against North Koreans, sending a clear signal to Pyongyang that involvement would mean becoming a direct party to the conflict without leniency.

Currently, around 10,000 North Korean soldiers are training in Russia, a number expected to rise as Vladimir Putin’s desperation grows. Some of these soldiers are beginning to move westward toward Ukraine, likely to initiate operations in support of Russian forces in the Kursk region. North Korea’s actions demand a firm response; however, additional Western sanctions alone may be insufficient. Two critical actions are needed: bolstering Ukrainian forces and urging South Korea to increase its military support for Kyiv.

Weapons and Efficient Mobilization: Ukraine's Need for Western Security Guarantees

President Zelensky’s „Victory Plan” emphasizes that any serious negotiations with Russia must be approached from a position of strength, but Ukraine’s military situation complicates this strategy. As Russia continues to apply relentless pressure on the front, Ukrainian forces are forced to reveal their positions, which Russia subsequently targets. This tactic underscores the urgent need for advanced reconnaissance defences, increased drone production, and the ability to bring artillery closer to the front lines. While Ukraine has developed some of these technologies, scaling their deployment and adapting them for optimal battlefield use will require substantial Western support, especially in the face of a potentially stagnating diplomatic landscape as U.S. elections approach and Western leaders weigh differing commitments to Ukraine.

While NATO membership would solidify Ukraine’s security, this goal is likely unattainable in the medium term due to NATO’s requirement for unanimous member approval—something not guaranteed given varied political stances, especially from Hungary. Instead, Zelensky is pushing for „ironclad guarantees” from Western allies, a necessity given Russia’s continued threat of destabilisation. Credible defence commitments from Europe’s central and western allies, beyond just the eastern and northern regions, are crucial. Without a unified and consistent Western commitment, Ukraine’s defence and stability may be compromised, as a lack of robust, long-term security support would leave Ukraine vulnerable to further Russian influence and aggression.

What's next for the Polish migration strategy?

As indicated by the legislator, the migration strategy for 2025-2030 redefines Poland’s approach to migration management, emphasizing more restrictive regulations. The adopted solutions aim to limit the influx of undesirable individuals, which is crucial in light of the increasing dynamics of migration flows and the rising number of migrants, particularly from Ukraine. The core idea is to regain control and ensure security. The priorities of the strategy are well-illustrated and commendable. However, implementation remains a key issue, and many doubts arise in this regard. The 2025-2030 migration strategy is a much-needed document that was undoubtedly missing in previous years. It highlights the key elements in the development of Polish immigration policy, which in the past was mainly emigration-focused. The strategy outlines the main goals, which will serve as guidelines during the implementation phases, divided into two periods: 2025–2027 and 2028–2030.

The sooner a migration policy is implemented that prioritizes Poland and its citizens, the better the future we will ensure for the next generations. The ability to travel, work, and study across the world is a remarkable opportunity. However, everything has its limits, especially when state security is at risk. We must remember that borders are not walls that enclose Poland but rather lines that help protect our values and identity. It is time to regain control and ensure security.

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East Front News is a weekly newsletter and article on Defence24.com summarizing the past week’s most important events concerning security and the situation in the Central and Eastern Europe region. It includes original opinions and comments, along with key news items significant from a Polish perspective.

Aleksander Olech, PhD & Jakub Palowski, Deputy Ed. in Chief