“Gigantic Hole”. Head of the National Security Bureau for Defence24 on Urgent Changes in Armaments, the Command System, and Plans for a 300,000-Strong Army

Jędrzej Graf: Minister, we are speaking shortly after a dispute took place in the Oval Office between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, US President Donald Trump, and JD Vance, which led to the breakdown of negotiations over a joint minerals utilization agreement in Ukraine. There are signals that the USA might completely cease its aid to Kyiv. How do you assess this?  And how might the policy of the new administration affect Poland’s security?

Dariusz Łukowski, Head of the National Security Bureau: At this moment, it is essential to exercise restraint in commenting on the process. Certainly, the unfortunate course of President Zelensky’s visit to Washington complicated the issue of the US–Ukrainian agreement, but it did not close the door on it.

The agreement has been negotiated; its text is »finalized« and both sides still see it as serving their interests. Further escalation of the dispute benefits no one. There are also signals, from both the American and Ukrainian sides, of readiness to return to talks. At the same time, decisions are being made that could negatively impact the ongoing military support for Ukraine by the United States. All of this shows that the talks will be difficult, but we must maintain perspective and focus on the core issue – the establishment of lasting peace.

A positive sign is what President Emmanuel Macron conveyed after his meeting with Donald Trump. Initially, the United States expressed no interest in directly participating in a potential operation in Ukraine, but later reports suggested that such an operation, if carried out by a European coalition, might be backed by the Americans. The details regarding the form of the operation were not specified, but we can imagine that it might involve logistical support, reconnaissance, or even air support. On Sunday, the British and the French declared in London their readiness to send forces as part of a peacekeeping mission – a good sign of the growing determination among European powers to take greater responsibility for the security of the continent.

In your opinion, in which direction is the US administration moving?

The current administration is a demanding partner in the sense that it operates unconventionally. Its way of acting often shocks a public used to more or less predictable responses. President Andrzej Duda believes that, regardless of current events, our efforts should focus on maintaining strong transatlantic ties.

From the conversations we’ve had with the Americans, and as reported by the government, we know that there is a degree of stability in Polish–American relations. There have been no indications of a potential reduction in the American presence in this part of Europe. On the contrary, the discussions suggest that their presence could even be strengthened should a coalition operation take place in Ukraine. There is room for American actions in the rear, i.e. on Polish territory.

However, there are reports of budget cuts at the Pentagon, which might affect the military presence in Europe.

One must always be prepared for changes regarding the deployment of US troops. Every new administration begins its term by reviewing its global presence and adjusting it to current interests.

The trend of reducing presence in Europe and shifting focus toward China is clear, as evidenced in the final documents of the NATO Summits in Vilnius and Washington.

I also understand the American call for greater engagement by European states in building their defence capacities – especially when considering how some countries approach the implementation of Article Three of the Washington Treaty concerning the development of their own potential. The USA is within its rights to demand that all allies contribute at an appropriate level.

Many relatively well-developed Western countries still limit their defense spending. Are the Americans aware?

Let’s look at it in terms of burdens – the GDPs of the European Union and the United States are very similar, accounting for about 15% of global GDP. Yet, when it comes to defense spending, 65% of NATO’s expenses are borne by American taxpayers, while the remaining 35% are covered by other countries. Clearly, this balance is skewed. Furthermore, the USA has about 340 million citizens compared to roughly 500 million in Europe. The standard of living in the Old Continent is completely different from that in the United States, where the middle class does not have it as »easy« as it might appear in Europe. These figures irritate the Americans.

Therefore, considering what Donald Trump emphasized during his first term, we, as Poland, fulfilled all our obligations – even going several steps further. At that time, there was no talk of allocating budgetary resources for defence at a level of 5% of GDP.

Today, Poland absolutely meets all its commitments. Moreover, as one of the few European countries, we also adhere to other standards regarding the presence of American troops. Under the agreement concluded during President Trump’s term in 2020, we essentially finance the stay of American troops on our territory – including the accompanying infrastructure. These are costs borne by our defense budget, not by the American taxpayer.

It is also important to note that their presence in our country does not violate the Russia–NATO Founding Act, which remains significant for the USA. In our view, that Act has been repeatedly violated by the Russians – even if only through the rearmament of the Kaliningrad exclave.

Let’s talk about a potential peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. We know that as a country, we do not wish to send our troops there, but is another form of engagement, such as reconnaissance or logistical support, being considered? What is your stance on this issue? 

Our intention is not to engage directly on Ukrainian territory – that is also the government’s position. Over 80% of the Polish public is clearly against such involvement, and we must take that into account.

So far, no formula for peace has been worked out; hence, everything we discuss is not yet grounded in reality. For example, we do not know whether the agreement will entail changes to the capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Today, Ukraine has an army of about one million, over a hundred brigades spread along the front line – currently the largest European army. The first question that arises is what the status of the Ukrainian army will be – whether and to what extent it might be reduced under a peace agreement or ceasefire. The Ukrainian army could function as a significant force that, on its own, would form an element of control. In such a situation, any potential coalition would only serve as a supporting element for the overall operation.

So what might such a mission involving European countries look like?

The shape of a potential operation will depend on many factors. The first is the current status of the Ukrainian forces.  We can also imagine that certain fortifications and defensive measures could be established to prevent the free maneuvering of Russian ground forces, thereby enhancing control over the demarcation line on both sides. In such a scenario, we wouldn’t be talking about a numerically significant contingent. It might consist of 10,000–20,000 soldiers operating in an interventionist role, training Ukrainian troops, with the potential to expand into a larger formation if necessary. Another factor to consider is the aforementioned guarantee of support from the American side – in terms of reconnaissance, intelligence, air, or logistical support.

We do not plan on having a physical presence of Polish troops on Ukrainian territory. This does not mean that we cannot support our neighbors in other ways. For example, over the past two years, we have already sent police forces for EOD operations. We can envision training missions, engineering infrastructure projects, or even air policing missions – with the understanding that we would operate from our bases, perhaps over western Ukraine, rather than being permanently stationed on Ukrainian soil.

Why, in your opinion, might Poland choose to decide on a limited engagement in Ukraine?

There is an argument concerning the historical relations between Poland and Ukraine, which may be exploited by Russia. While this is significant, I wouldn’t overestimate it, because doing so would essentially be admitting to yielding to Russian propaganda and information warfare – especially since Moscow has been attempting to divide our societies for decades.

The crucial point is that Poland represents the only real line of defense on NATO’s eastern flank. We are the backbone of the forces that are expected to mount the first resistance – and that remains our primary task. Our borders lie with Belarus, the Kaliningrad oblast, the Suwałki Gap, and the Baltic Sea. Today, the Baltic is becoming a testing ground for military forces.   We are witnessing what is happening with regard to critical undersea infrastructure, and we have our own interests here: we are expanding gas port facilities, port installations, and have significant investments in offshore facilities that must also be protected. In essence, we are focusing on the northern direction, which we want to develop together with the Baltic states.

Moreover, if our allied countries find it difficult to calculate the forces that can be deployed for a potential operation in Ukraine, we could increase our presence on the eastern flank – for example, in Romania (where the French are present) – in order to »ease the burden« on our allies, encouraging them to boost their involvement in Ukraine. There are many solutions.

Diverting Polish armed forces from tasks related to securing the eastern flank would weaken NATO. In this context, remember that any engagement by European states, particularly Poland, in Ukraine will directly affect NATO’s own defense planning.

So how might a mission in Ukraine affect NATO’s planning?

In Europe, we are facing a shortage of forces. The challenge lies in fulfilling current defense plans with real, available forces. Even if European countries step up their defense spending, combat capabilities won’t increase overnight.  The industry cannot immediately meet the demand, and the number of soldiers won’t surge instantly – we’re talking about years of substantial effort.

Therefore, when considering an operation in Ukraine, planned for at least a decade, we must acknowledge that it will be executed with the resources available today. This profound deficit in capabilities will also impact plans for defending our own territory. There are many consequences and implications stemming from all of this.

Many politicians, commanders, and analysts point out that a potential ceasefire might allow Russia to catch its breath and rebuild its forces. Doesn’t that create a bigger security dilemma for us? The operational commander, General Klisz, warned that once a ceasefire is in place, the clock will start ticking for us. The question is: have we truly learned the lesson of preparing our own state? Public opinion often focuses on high-profile modernization programs, but what is our status regarding strategic documents, the actions of our military and state administration, and our command system?

We cannot afford to be complacent and assume that high defense spending and active armaments programs automatically equate to security.

At the National Security Bureau, we have identified many areas that require changes – including the level of preparedness within state administration. Every government should, at the very least, in its first year in office, conduct exercises on command and control of national defence. This would help test the division of responsibilities and operational protocols, because in the event of a threat, there will be no time to sort things out.

Our recent exercises with President Andrzej Duda, as well as with the previous government and parliament, revealed certain gaps. These exercises led to numerous conclusions that have formed the basis for a presidential draft bill on the actions of state authorities in the event of an external threat to national security – a bill that envisages changes in the command system and the use of the Polish Armed Forces.

This bill is just one of many elements that need to be regulated in our laws, and it requires close cooperation with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. I would also note that for the President, it does not matter whether these solutions are branded as a »presidential« or »government« bill – what matters is that the decision-making system regarding the use of force and national security is improved.

What effects might these changes produce? Could you provide an example?

The scope of the changes is very broad, but I can focus on one aspect that is underappreciated by us yet effectively exploited by the Russian side.

The Russians have unfettered access to our legal regulations, as these are published – for instance, in the Journal of Laws. By analyzing our provisions, they can construct a matrix of how our state functions: how we react in specific formal situations, under what conditions we shift from one state of readiness to another, and when full or selective mobilization of the army or economy is triggered. Essentially, the enemy can determine a threshold defined by our national legislation and legal conditions; once this threshold is exceeded, our decision-making processes in response to certain threats are activated.

Hybrid operations are designed so as not to cross that decision-making threshold while maximizing the effect of hostile measures. Thus, we should develop structures and laws that signal to the enemy that the state is capable of counteraction in any situation. For example, the state could carry out counter-surge actions, which would force the adversary into a dilemma. Of course, this does not mean we will necessarily implement such actions – nor can we divulge our plans for them – but we should at least create a level of uncertainty among the Russians, which would affect their calculations.

The current regulations, both domestic and international, are largely tailored to realities from decades past and do not match the present situation. Russia, after all, has not formally declared war on Ukraine; it has stated that it is conducting a »special operation,« which creates ambiguities regarding, for example, the application of international law on armed conflicts.

Do Ukrainians not say that all the documents and regulations they had a few days into the war proved inadequate for the situation? Should we draw on their experiences?

Absolutely. However, even without Ukrainian experiences, a well-designed exercise can open our eyes to the problems. Even an attempt to apply a hypothetical scenario within the framework of current regulations will reveal whether they function as intended. Therefore, it is essential to conduct exercises and verify the solutions we adopt.  

Minister, I wanted to ask about the defence industry. On the one hand, orders have been increasing for the past three years, but we very often see that, in the context of the state-run industry concentrated within the PGZ Group, certain vestiges, structural problems, a lack of technology, or a modern machinery inventory are affecting its capabilities. The President emphasizes the need to also engage the private industry, even those entities that do not have a defence specialization but do have production capacity; France and Germany make use of such companies. In your opinion, does the Ministry of Defence work with such businesses?

The Ministry of Defence is aware of the problems. However, defence industry companies are overseen by the Ministry of State Assets. Certainly, the defence industry must be reformed – especially in the most urgent area, ammunition production, where we have a »gigantic hole.« We will be buying ammunition practically everywhere it is produced, maybe even in Ukraine, but just not here.

I do not entirely agree with the thesis of the dominant position of the Polish Armaments Group in the market. Today, we can still speak of a privileged position since it is owned by the State Treasury. However, most of the leading products are developed in cooperation with private entities. For example, the man-portable anti-aircraft system „Piorun” has a seeker manufactured by a private company. And that most important element, in which the missile’s intelligence is embedded, is mounted in the missile body paired with an engine produced at Mesko, which belongs to the PGZ. Moreover, the integrator of the modern unmanned turret ZSSW-30, produced by the Polish Armaments Group, is the WB Group. The turret incorporates foreign components, a cannon and anti-tank guided missiles, and the „Borsuk,” which will be integrated with it, has a German engine. Unfortunately, this means we are not dealing with purely Polish technology and full production autonomy.

Looking more broadly at Europe, several problems converge upon us. If, for example, Germany increases its defence spending by one percent of GDP, that amounts to over 45 billion dollars per year, and in the case of France, over 35 billion.  On a European scale, that would be hundreds of billions of dollars annually. The question is whether the European industry is capable of meeting such demand if the defence budgets of the Old Continent’s countries were increased by one percent of GDP. Supply chain problems may therefore arise. The mere willingness on our part to allocate more funds to defence will not be enough to achieve an effective transformation in a short period.

How can these problems be solved? Many countries have international partners in their supply chains.

We must strive to build our own solutions. South Korea, using external technology from the USA, and to a lesser extent from European partners, has developed a range of its own solutions, which it now sells on the market. However, that process has been ongoing since the 1960s. It must be a long-term process, a strategy carried out regardless of who governs the country.

There is a certain risk in our pursuit of a rapid, even revolutionary, expansion of the Armed Forces combined with the technological progress taking place on today’s battlefields, as we see in Ukraine. We have no guarantee that the equipment we acquire in a few years will meet modern technological standards. For example, today for tanks, an active protection system, especially against drones, is crucial for survival on the battlefield. We must have the capability for continuous modernization of the systems we introduce.

When it comes to the Armed Forces, on one hand we have a plan to develop six divisions, and on the other, we face demographic and logistical challenges. More and more, there are claims that concepts considered realistic just two years ago will be difficult to achieve. How do you, Minister, view the feasibility of these plans, especially given that you were still in active service dealing with logistics?

We must be aware of the demographic challenges we face, not only is this Poland’s problem, but other countries, including Russia, are grappling with it as well. Today, one of the elements when building the armed forces and selecting systemic solutions should be to look for approaches that reduce the demand for personnel while simultaneously increasing combat capabilities.

These challenges favor combat platforms that can be operated by smaller crews. Reducing the crew size by one person across a thousand tanks or howitzers means a thousand fewer people. This also affects the capacity to replace personnel during a war. 

We must, as quickly as possible, adopt all types of autonomous platforms. The Americans, Turks, and Koreans are already doing so. I’m referring to land vehicles, aerial systems, including unmanned fighter jets, and naval platforms.

Ukraine shows what can be achieved with unmanned systems, also in the maritime domain, though paradoxically this does not mean that we do not need a conventional Navy. We very much need classic ships, both for peacetime operations and during crises. We are currently facing a crisis in the Baltic, and the Navy is crucial here; naval forces are essential for securing communication lines and also support the protection of critical infrastructure. We also need ships to monitor and control the transfer of various means in defiance of sanctions, and the Baltic Sea is very important for Russia: St. Petersburg is one of its key industrial centers. Of course, we must explore possibilities for cooperation between manned and unmanned platforms across all domains. As I mentioned before, we must strive to limit the involvement of personnel wherever possible.

It follows that the plan to build a 300,000-strong Armed Forces will be difficult to achieve.

A force of 300,000 professional soldiers is today a level that is difficult to reach. Hence, a variety of other forms of service and personnel training must be considered. Equally, I would focus not only on increasing the number of personnel but also on improving their quality. We already face problems recruiting the right people: those who are qualified, well-educated, and capable of operating technologically advanced combat platforms. We are not talking about ordinary infantry, but highly specialized systems used in combat operations. We must also expect that personnel expenses will increasingly consume part of the growth in the army’s budget, as an ever-larger military must also be ever more competitive in the labour market for people with the right skills and qualifications.

The Russians do not value human life.

They accept something that is unacceptable in our societies. For us, the life of every soldier is priceless. For that reason, we will purchase platforms that provide maximum protection for their crews.

Lost equipment is the least of the problems: it can be replaced. It is much harder, however, to train another crew and have people ready to fight. 

In addition to the aforementioned platforms that reduce or even replace personnel, we are also investing in supporting decision-making processes with elements of artificial intelligence, so that there is no need to maintain large staffs. Thanks to this, command posts will require fewer personnel, and it will not diminish their decision-making capacity or situational awareness.

Another example of automation is the electronic barriers we have on our eastern border with Belarus and Kaliningrad. We will also be building the Eastern Shield system, which will be operated by the military: will it be integrated?

Let’s distinguish these matters a bit. Directly on the border, a surveillance system is being expanded to reduce the involvement of personnel in border protection. Our goal here is to hand over full responsibility for direct border protection to the Border Guard, without involving the military, because that negatively impacts morale, training processes, and many other operational and logistical aspects.

On the other hand, the aim of the military Eastern Shield system is not to protect the border during peacetime. These are elements that, during a conflict, are meant to slow down or channel the enemy’s movements. The components of the Eastern Shield may include areas designated for mining, engineering enhancements, as well as terrain modifications, afforestation, water reservoirs, and so on. An example of the effectiveness of fortifications is the Russian „Surovikin Line” established in occupied Ukraine. It contributed, along with other factors, to Ukraine’s inability to break through the Russian defences during the spring counteroffensive, despite having modern combat vehicles and reconnaissance capabilities. Of course, by building fortifications, Poland is also defending Europe, and Europe should support the financing of this endeavor. We are taking steps in that direction.

We spoke earlier about the Navy; I would also like to ask about the Orka program—the submarines. It has been postponed many times, but the latest declarations from the Ministry of National Defence indicate that it will be implemented. In your opinion, why are submarines necessary? 

Submarines are necessary for Poland for many reasons. First of all, the specific conditions of the Baltic Sea, including its salinity, make submarines very difficult to detect—even though the Baltic is rather shallow. Therefore, they can be used very effectively, even during peacetime.  They also play a key role in perfecting methods and tactics for anti-submarine warfare. Today, we are building frigates capable of carrying helicopters for anti-submarine operations. But how can one train in these capabilities if the Navy does not have its own submarines?

As for the frigates themselves, they obviously have many combat capabilities that are vital for securing the Polish coast and critical infrastructure. In wartime, they will not operate independently but rather in groups with air and submarine cover. Their role in allied cooperation and planning is also significant. According to NATO calculations, committing one frigate to a NATO maritime group is equivalent to committing an entire army brigade. There is no need to explain how costly and complicated it is to deploy an army brigade over long distances and secure its operations. At the beginning of our NATO membership, we relied on land forces—brigades that are expensive to deploy, maintain, and require thousands of people. Frigates are a far more cost-effective means for carrying out tasks within an alliance system.

Thank you for this conversation.