Russia has returned to the Soviet model. Gen. Klisz: We must prepare society [INTERVIEW]

Jędrzej Graf: Today there is increasing talk about a ceasefire in Ukraine, which paradoxically could have negative consequences for Poland. In one of your statements, you mentioned that once a ceasefire is accepted in Ukraine, the clock will start ticking for us, and the threat from the Russian Federation will increase. How do you see this danger for us in the coming years? Is war inevitable?  

Div. Gen. Maciej Klisz, Operational Command of the Armed Forces: That is a good question to which it is difficult to answer. If we were to follow history, one might say yes, war is inevitable, because we are probably the luckiest generation living in Europe without a full-scale war. We had the war in the Balkans in 1991–1995, and since 2022 a full-scale war in Ukraine, which has been taking place in another dimension since 2014. 

We must also ask whether we are already living in wartime. If we look at activities in the cyber domain, attacks on critical infrastructure, including Polish infrastructure, the situation at the border, or the use of chemical weapons against Skripals in the United Kingdom, it shows that in many dimensions (of course, besides the most tangible, kinetic one) we are already in a conflict with the Russian Federation. Of course, the question remains as to what its character is today and what it will be in the future.

So, is that proverbial clock ticking? When can we expect a large-scale threat?

Yes, the clock is already ticking and the moment is approaching when it will start ticking even faster. In a way, the full-scale war in Ukraine will end, giving the Russian Federation the opportunity to rebuild its resources.

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when the moment of a large-scale threat against NATO will appear. I follow various, both overt and covert, assessments of Moscow’s capability development, and there are certain discrepancies.

Personally, I do not expect that within four or five years Russia will be able to confront the North Atlantic Alliance purely on a military level. However, there will certainly be increasingly intensive diplomatic, informational, economic, and broadly defined hybrid operations that will weaken national and allied collective defense capabilities. The range of instruments at Moscow’s disposal is very broad, and we must strengthen our resilience. 

Poland’s political leadership says it wants to prepare defensive capabilities within two to three years to face such a threat with our current resources. Is this possible?

Building defensive capabilities is a complex and time-consuming process. I mentioned this, for example, during a recent lecture for cadets at the Military University of Technology. In simple terms, you cannot develop capabilities cheaply, quickly, and effectively all at once. If we decide to do it at minimal cost, both indirectly and directly, we won’t be able to do it quickly and properly. And if we decide to act quickly, it certainly won’t be cheap.   

The Polish army is such a large organization, practically a corporation, currently counting 208,000 soldiers. Certain processes cannot be carried out overnight. Recently, I explained to first- and fifth-year military university students that today we are launching processes that will determine what the Polish Armed Forces will look like in 15 years. By way of analogy: today we are dealing with the consequences of decisions made around 2010, when the obligation of basic military service was suspended and many garrisons were closed. The image of the army we have today is the result of those decisions. Currently, reserve training is evoking strong emotions, as is the discussion about the possibilities of more widespread training. Not everything can be done in one or two years, although of course, we must take action.

Recently, Prime Minister Tusk talked about a program for universal, voluntary training that would cover even 100,000 people annually. There are various voices, including critical ones; what is your opinion on this initiative?

The decision on what the training will be like is up to my superiors, and they will make it. However, regarding my own assessment of the needs in this area and the desired direction, we cannot avoid the subject of defensive training for the population. I stress „defensive,” because not everyone needs to, or even should, be trained in military matters. We must prepare society for defence, and defence is a much broader scope of state activity than just the armed forces. Not everyone has to shoot and fight with a weapon in hand, but all citizens capable of doing so should be prepared for defence.   

Article 85 of the Constitution states that it is every citizen’s duty to defend the Homeland. I often emphasize this, even in conversations with highly educated people, lawyers, etc.: this is not a provision of any military regulation but the highest legal act. And we must prepare as a society to fulfill this duty. 

Of course, these trainings should vary in character, not only military: for some roles in civil defence, a few days may suffice, while for military training a thirty-day course may be necessary. Preparing 100,000 people annually is a very big challenge, because the Polish Armed Forces today number over 200,000 soldiers, including those in the Voluntary General Military Service, but we must be able to meet this challenge.

Would the training also have to involve reservists, those who have left active duty?

I would like to refer here to the Finnish model, which I consider the most effective. In Finland, a large part of defensive training is handled by the MPK organization, which brings together former soldiers as well as police officers and other service members. They can provide excellent support, although we cannot copy the Finnish model or any other one-to-one because that does not end well. 

I’d add that we would like to involve as many former military personnel in the training as possible, but we also know that it cannot be everyone—it is simply not physically possible. However, it is important that a professional soldier remains connected to the military after leaving active duty so that his skills can be utilized in times of threat, according to his qualifications. In the United States, for example, a professional soldier, for several years after ending his military service, remains in the so-called Individual Ready Reserve and can be quickly called up when needed. Our reserve system should take such potential into account.

There is also a discussion about what the training should look like, whether it should be mandatory or voluntary. Many officers in reserve believe that the training should be compulsory.

Whether the training will be mandatory or not will be a political decision by my superiors, just as the suspension of basic military service in 2009 was a political decision. Officers and generals can only advise. Personally, I believe that part of the training should be mandatory.

Of course, this does not mean a return to previously existing solutions, as there are many others. In allied countries, such as Lithuania or Sweden, there are incentive systems related to the compulsory nature of the training. For example, there is a plan for a pool of individuals scheduled for training. Initially, those who volunteer are accepted, and they have higher salaries or the right to choose their place of service, among other benefits. And if needed, a certain number of people are conscripted in a given year. We too should start with a clear determination of how many people we can and must train within a given period.

There is also the question of the impact of these trainings on the economy, because people in training will be pulled from their workplaces.

I am in a relatively good position here because, under the command of General Wiesław Kukuła, I participated in the preparation and formation of the Territorial Defence Forces. Our „sixteen” was formed based on research that unequivocally showed that employers do not agree to have their employees trained for 30 or 45 days, and we would not have enough volunteers; the Territorial Defence Forces were initially conceived as a volunteer formation.

At first, this form of training was often ridiculed, but today it has become established and serves as a basis for the training of Voluntary Basic Military Service, with some added elements and reduced training intensity. Even during the preparation of the „sixteen,” we adopted the assumption that certain elements, which can be delivered without having to put everyone in barracks, in an e-learning format, could be provided to soldiers before the training. Today, in Ukraine, we see how many training elements, often specialized, are widely available in electronic (remote training) form.

Of course, the right selection of elements is necessary, because we will not be teaching people who have never handled a weapon remotely how to operate it, but certain purely theoretical topics, regulations, etc., can certainly be conducted in this form even during basic training. In my opinion, training must meet three criteria: it must be intensive, interesting, and innovative. Soldiers must be engaged during training, feel satisfaction, and look forward to the next training days.

And how do you assess the current training being conducted? Often there are voices, including from participants and reservists, that some of the training does not meet contemporary requirements.

I must admit that I see much that needs improvement, on our side, on the military side: we must listen more to what people are telling us. For example, if soldiers are to be involved in the cyberprotection of infrastructure or perform other specialized tasks, then they do not need to conduct live-fire exercises, even if it brings them joy. In reserve training, we must focus on preparing for the tasks we will perform in wartime. And at this moment, there is much to improve, also on our part.

I would like to move to a somewhat different issue, related to the use of unmanned systems. In Ukraine, the Russian Federation is using them on a massive scale, at various levels. Drones change frequencies in real time, or are controlled via fiber optic cables. This grants a capability to conduct intense engagements against military targets, as well as the support infrastructure beyond the frontline. How should we build system capabilities to counter these threats in the Polish Army?   

That is a really big challenge and at the same time one of the areas of the „Big Seven” that General Kukuła mentioned. We are looking at drones through the lens of the war in Ukraine, where we have minefields stretching over several kilometers. This hindered, if not prevented, maneuver warfare, and the combat environment has returned to that of World War I. We see that First Person View drones have largely replaced anti-tank guided missiles, and the Geran/Shahed systems and others developed in Russia for similar tasks — cruise missiles of the Kh-555/Kh-101 class — are used for a simple reason: they are cheaper. War, especially a prolonged one, is all about economics.

When it comes to countering drones, during peacetime we are very limited in the use of any kinetic means. I mention this also because we must be aware that this is not only a threat in wartime, but also in peace, as I mentioned earlier. In Ukraine, about half of the strike-class Geran drones are destroyed by kinetic weapons, such as light machine guns, heavy machine guns, sometimes anti-aircraft guns, by anti-aircraft platoons networked in  proper command systems.

Electronic warfare measures are also used: this element we can, in fact, use during peacetime, and when that is not effective, missile-based anti-aircraft systems are used. However, there is a dilemma here, because missiles costing several hundred thousand dollars are used to counter systems that cost a few tens of thousands of dollars.

There are reports of drones being countered by other drones.

Yes, but so far these solutions do not have a systemic character, at least when it comes to countering strike systems. The Polish Armed Forces will strive to build systemic solutions that must include both kinetic and non-kinetic systems. As for the latter, the remaining option is electromagnetic energy, and in the future maybe lasers or another directed energy. As the Operational Command, we are involved in the work of a team that is being carried out by the Inspectorate of Military Unmanned Weapon Systems. For me, it is crucial that the systems we use can function during peacetime as well, because then we can employ them as part of air defences.

At the same time, I am aware that systemic solutions are needed to counter different types of drones. We must also include kinetic systems. I know that one Polish company is working on such a solution with a 30 mm cannon. On the other hand, there is a need for a system of widespread defense and protection against small drones, directly for vehicles that we acquire for tens of millions of zlotys. And in wartime, these have to be kinetic solutions, because they are the most effective; electronic warfare, unfortunately, is not enough.

Another issue is swarm operations, autonomous systems, both in terms of deploying drones and countering them. Artificial intelligence is evolving, as is swarm operation, and in Ukraine we see cooperation between waterborne and airborne drones. Of course, there remains a dilemma whether an operator will always be involved or if it will be solely machines. Computer systems are already faster than humans, so perhaps the solution is „human on the loop,” meaning maintaining human control, but without continuous operation.

You have mentioned four to five years in the context of the time until a potential outbreak of conflict. It is no secret that we have transferred a great deal of equipment as donations, especially from the Land Forces segment, to Ukraine, because it was in our strategic interest for Kyiv to have resources to fight. Today the Ministry of National Defence is looking for ways to fill this gap, often through foreign purchases. There are many voices of critique, for example in the context of the discussion about the Borsuk, and at the same time we know we need much more of that equipment. How do you assess the possibility of such intervention purchases?

As the Operational Commander, I am in a much better position because I am responsible for the way certain capabilities are built. I do not define whether it is the Borsuk, Marder, Puma, CBWP, Otokar, Ajax, or some other vehicle. I define straight away the capabilities that result from documents of even higher rank, i.e. NATO plans and goals, which are translated here, in the Operational Command, into our capability requirements.

I have to look at the expansion of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts, the expansion of the military-industrial complex, a return to solutions functioning in the times of the USSR. I see that and translate it into capabilities, also regarding combat vehicles, but I do not take a position on what the caliber of the cannon should be, who the producer should be, or which specific type of solution is used. I define the national needs in terms of overall capabilities; certainly, we need combat vehicles, but I do not speak of the details.

Generally, the course of conflicts forces us to ask where the level of „good enough” is sufficiently good. Of course, we would always like to have that dream solution called in the military „Death Star.” We are always looking for it because, for example, if we have a 30 mm cannon on a 20-ton vehicle, there will be voices suggesting to increase the caliber to 40 mm and reduce the weight to a few tons while increasing the number of soldiers carried. I definitely see the issue: yes, we need this and we need it quickly in terms of years, not decades. Because if the Borsuk takes 12 years, that is not fast enough. But there is, of course, the question of whether we have such capabilities and whether we know how to build the industrial capabilities that we either lack or have lost.

Thank you for this conversation.