What Does Russia Want? What Must Happen for the War in Ukraine to End?

In recent weeks, discussions about a potential resolution to the war have intensified, especially following Donald Trump’s election as the 47th President of the United States, which has undoubtedly accelerated the process. Media reports on various proposals for a ceasefire might suggest that a Russian-Ukrainian agreement is within reach. However, the lack of concrete solutions rooted in realistic possibilities and the significant discrepancies between both sides make any major diplomatic breakthrough unlikely in the near future, especially given that official negotiations between Russia and Ukraine are nonexistent.

While we can broadly outline Ukraine’s key demands, such as securing NATO membership, even at the cost of territorial losses, Russia’s perspective is less clear for various reasons. Yet, any discussion of freezing the conflict must take it into account.

This raises the question: What needs to happen for peace to be achieved? Is a compromise even possible, on the Russia’s part? Examining Russia’s demands and the Kremlin’s perspective is essential; ignoring this viewpoint reduces talk of a settlement to mere fantasy.

Putin’s Ultimatum

To understand the conflict, it’s worth revisiting December 2021. At that time, Vladimir Putin issued an ultimatum to NATO and the United States, demanding several significant concessions from the West. These included halting NATO expansion (with particular emphasis on rejecting Ukraine’s membership) and banning the deployment of NATO weapons and troops in countries that joined the alliance after 1997, including Poland. Why these demands were fundamentally unacceptable to the West has been analyzed extensively, including in articles published on Defence24.pl.

More recently, Tucker Carlson’s interview with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov highlighted that, nearly three years after the 2021 ultimatum, the Kremlin’s demands remain unchanged, and have even expanded. Russia now seeks to ban NATO military exercises in Ukraine, formalize its annexation of currently occupied Ukrainian territories, and exert greater influence over Ukraine’s domestic policies, particularly concerning the Russian language and domestic, Ukrainian media.

The Tragic Politics

Was the rejection of Putin’s 2021 ultimatum truly the catalyst for the war, or was the decision to invade made earlier?

Dr. Michał Patryk Sadłowski, Director of the Center for Russian Statehood Studies, argues that the roots of the conflict go back to 2013–2014. During that period, Russia realized that Ukraine’s alignment with Western institutions was irreversible - institutionally, and societally.

“Back then, it wasn’t about NATO integration, as Russian propaganda claims. It was about Ukraine’s growing ties with the European Union. The Kremlin, particularly Vladimir Putin, feared that closer relations with the EU would lead Ukraine to drift away from Russia culturally, linguistically, economically, and geopolitically. This, in turn, could influence Russian society and ultimately challenge the country’s political system.”

“Post-2014 Ukraine became, for the Kremlin, a pro-Western outpost against their vision of the world. The Kremlin feared Ukraine more on an ideological than a military level. Thus, the invasion of 24th February, 2022, aimed to swiftly »resolve the Ukrainian issue,« not only by presenting the West with a fait accompli but, above all, to solidify the rule and legitimacy of Vladimir Putin. It was intended to be a »Crimean effect 2.0,« only on a larger scale,” continued Dr. Sadłowski.

At this point, it is worth returning to a question posed earlier in the text: Could NATO countries and the broader West have prevented the Russian invasion in February 2022? According to Dr. Sadłowski, by December 2021, this was practically impossible. “Western concessions would have achieved nothing because Moscow’s goal was not just taking over Crimea or Donbas. The primary aim was to halt all processes of Ukraine’s integration with the West. Russia’s main objective was a very significant (if not complete) reduction of Ukrainian sovereignty,” he stated.

“If we closely analyze Vladimir Putin’s ideology of power, especially its evolution, I believe that confrontation was inevitable,” the expert summarized.

While recognizing the tragedy of the entire situation, it is important to note that the awareness of the inevitability of the impending conflict did not paralyze Western decision-making circles completely. Instead, fortunately, it acted as a motivating factor to a large extent. This is particularly true of the actions taken by U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration, which, in the fall of 2021, decided to release American intelligence data on an unprecedented scale. The aim of these actions was not only to “expose the Kremlin’s cards” but also to alarm European allies about the growing Russian threat and warn the Kremlin about the severe consequences of initiating a conflict.

Of course, questions always arise in such contexts about whether enough was done to prevent the war. Nearly three years after the outbreak of full-scale war, many things are viewed differently, and several actions would “certainly” have been handled better. However, the accusation that poorly conducted Western policy in 2021 led to the conflict is overly unfair. December 2021 and the subsequent events were merely the result of years of Western permissiveness, emboldening Putin since at least the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008.

(Un)willingness to Compromise

Considering the gradually expanding list of Putin’s demands and the recent advances by the Russian army on the front, it is difficult to look optimistically at the future. The possibility of a Ukrainian victory and expelling the invaders from all occupied territories has likely already been missed, and widespread war fatigue will increasingly lead to acceptance of certain concessions and, consequently… losses (particularly for Ukraine). The question remains: Are both sides of the conflict ready for compromise?

For Ukraine, NATO membership seems, at this point, a non-negotiable guarantee. However, for Russia, there are more contentious issues. This is evident in Lavrov’s recent statements, which effectively confirm the vision of ending the conflict presented by Vladimir Putin on June 14, 2024, during a meeting with the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

“Putin demanded the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions, which, along with Crimea and Sevastopol, are regarded by Russia as constituent entities of the Russian Federation. Additionally, he demanded the protection of »the rights, freedoms, and interests of Russian-speaking citizens in Ukraine,« which serves as a basis for Russian interference in the rest of Ukraine’s territory, especially in the areas Putin refers to as »southeastern Ukraine,« which he considers a historical part of greater Russia,” recalls Dr. Michał Sadłowski. He emphasizes that, from the Kremlin’s perspective, the key demand is the demilitarization of Ukraine, the limitation of its sovereignty, and its designation as a so-called “neutral, non-aligned, and non-nuclear” state.

“(…) By maintaining the front in Ukraine (and achieving certain tactical successes in various directions), the Russian authorities are exerting very intense diplomatic pressure on the West and Ukraine to end or freeze the conflict on terms most favorable to them, without losing tools or means of influencing Ukraine’s population, political forces, and government in the future,” concludes the expert, drawing a parallel to the so-called Georgian scenario. Current events in Tbilisi clearly demonstrate that Russian influence remains strong there, and Georgia has once again distanced itself from Western institutions for at least several years.

Tug of War

The observed intensification of both diplomatic and military efforts is likely to continue for at least several weeks. The change of power in the United States, which will formally occur with Donald Trump’s inauguration as the 47th President, is a motivating factor for both sides, as they strive to achieve the best possible “starting position.”

“Despite internal issues, Moscow assumes it still has several months to conduct more intense combat operations, aiming to potentially wear down the West and Ukraine. Ultimately, all of this is expected to lead to favorable diplomatic resolutions. Such a potential Kremlin success in this war would then be used domestically to solidify the current political course and the state’s governance system,” argues Dr. Sadłowski.

The analyst also recognizes similar determination on the Western side. President Joe Biden’s decision to allow Ukraine to use ATACMS missile systems to strike selected targets in Russia, along with new NATO and EU financial support initiatives for Kyiv, are examples of this. What awaits us in 2025?

“It cannot be ruled out that we might cautiously consider a scenario where, by spring, Putin fails to break through or significantly improve his position on the front. If there is such an opportunity and willingness from the new U.S. administration, the Kremlin may opt for freezing the conflict. Domestically, it would propagate a narrative of territorial success and having »stopped NATO expansion« on the Ukrainian front. At the same time, Moscow would actively lobby for lifting or at least easing some sanctions. This all means that the content of such a freeze will be critical. However, in certain cases, a freeze does not necessarily imply complete calm along the front line. We must therefore also consider the »neither war nor peace« scenario,” concludes Dr. Sadłowski.