Europe has a weak hand. Andrew Michta on Ukraine, Zelensky, and Trump [INTERVIEW]

Why might Donald Trump’s conversation with Volodymyr Zelensky have tragic consequences for Europe? What does it mean for Poland and our part of the continent? Does the new American administration have a “vision of victory”? Are we witnessing a reset in USA–Russia policy? These are among the questions discussed by Michał Górski with Dr. Andrew Michta (Atlantic Council).

Michał Górski, Defence24.pl: It is impossible not to begin our conversation with what happened on Friday, February 28th in Washington. What is your assessment of the Trump–Zelensky meeting and that quarrel in the Oval Office, witnessed by the entire world?

Dr. Andrew A. Michta, Atlantic Council: To call it a quarrel is a mild description. What occurred was a quasi-brawl in the White House. Considering the kind of person Donald Trump is and the way he exercises the presidency, it is clear that establishing personal relationships is paramount. Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to Washington was quite successful, the French president managed to create a certain chemistry with Trump. Regardless of what was agreed, he succeeded in establishing a thread of personal contact. The British prime minister fared worse; there was a noticeable awkwardness. However, with Zelensky, it resulted in a tragic and unnecessary confrontation. This does not serve the interests of Ukraine, the United States, or the entire transatlantic community. We can only imagine how the Russians are watching this, rubbing their hands together. It was even worse than an unfortunate event.

I was concerned that if no personal contact were established between President Trump and Zelensky, then relations between the USA and Ukraine would continue to deteriorate. It is not clear to me why such discussions were held in front of cameras and under the spotlight. Conversations about how relations should move forward and how an agreement should be reached ought to take place in the privacy of an office between presidents and their advisors.

Zelensky was in a weaker position from the start and should have understood that President Trump’s view on the war in Ukraine is inextricably linked to the context of American domestic politics (referencing Biden’s presidency during Friday’s media briefing – ed.). The Ukrainian delegation ought to be aware of this.

Let me emphasize once again: this is a tragic event for transatlantic relations and for the fate of Ukraine.
Dr Andrew Michta, Atlantic Council

Immediately after the meeting, President Trump posted on his social media that it was a “significant meeting,” but added, “Zelensky did not show respect to the United States, and if he wants to return to the USA for talks, he must come back with a peace proposal.”

Also symptomatic of all this is that Zelensky left the White House immediately after the Oval Office meeting, and the resource agreement that was supposed to be signed that day was ultimately not concluded…

This represents a collapse of the entire process and a realization that the Trump and Zelensky administrations are operating on two entirely different planes in terms of how the war should end. The worst part is that we don’t even know whether anything was negotiated during this visit. We knew even before the visit that Zelensky was demanding security guarantees in exchange for rare earth metals. And here too, we do not know how things ultimately turned out.

Europe’s tragedy is that, despite all these combat confirmations (including Friedrich Merz’s announcement that the time has come for the states of the Old Continent to become independent of the USA – ed.), it has little to offer. Let’s not listen to the rhetoric, but look at the realities. A cavalcade of European leaders in Washington is an admission that Europe has no cards in this game. It lacks military forces, ammunition depots, equipment, proper command, etc.

In the context of transatlantic politics, talking about a common policy towards Europe hardly makes sense, because Washington’s policy will be conducted bilaterally. An era is ending, one that functioned during President Joe Biden’s tenure and treated Europe as a single, unitary actor. Issues will no longer be settled solely through Brussels or, possibly, Berlin.

In summary, this is a very bad moment for European security and for the future sovereignty of Ukraine. Unfortunately, I do not see an awareness in Polish debates, both at the governmental level and in expert panels, of how dangerous the situation in the region is becoming, and that Poland risks losing its sovereignty. I am surprised that Poland does not have an ambassador-level representative in Washington. When we look at the way Donald Trump governs, it is all based on personal ties. The fact that the government cannot sit down with President Duda to agree on a candidate is difficult to understand.

Referring to Friedrich Merz’s remark, can Europe really afford to cut off relations with the Americans? In what position would Poland find itself then?

During the Munich Security Conference, I heard someone say, “If Europeans, especially Germans, think that the Chinese will guarantee security in a military sense, then Europe ceases to be what it has been for the last 700 years.”

If the United States were to withdraw from Europe — in other words, if there were an authentic rupture in transatlantic relations — what situation would Poland face if negotiations over spheres of influence between Moscow and the major capitals in Western Europe were to begin? To what extent could Poland maintain its sovereignty in such an arrangement? How much of that sovereignty would have to be ceded in terms of its own military, defense spending, or energy policy?

Even if Poland remained within European structures, without the deterrence guarantee provided by the United States, we would be looking at a completely different situation. None of the flank countries, not even Finland, have the means to provide themselves with an umbrella and effective deterrence. That is the reason why the Finns and Swedes suddenly joined the alliance. It was a reflection of how dramatically the situation has changed.

In the worst-case scenario: if a fire were to break out in the Indo-Pacific that would pull American troops from Europe; Putin might decide to “jump” over the NATO fence, leading to a forceful resolution. We are in an extremely dangerous moment. Contrary to many strategists, I do not believe that we have five years of preparation for a potential Russian attack. There is less time than that. On this subject, I have prepared a special report for the Atlantic Council, in which I describe how quickly the Russians can rebuild their ground forces. Considering the reorientation of the Russian economy towards armaments, the role of China in all this, as well as supplies from North Korea or Iran, in my view Russia will be able to reach the peak of rebuilding its ground forces within just three years.

And what does it mean for us?

If we look at how loosely and sluggishly Europeans (especially the Germans, but also the French and the British, not to mention smaller states like the Netherlands) operate, and at the speed with which Russia is rebuilding its armed forces, we see that a delta is forming between where the Russians will soon be and where the European part of NATO is. This delta means that if Putin decides to opt for a military solution, he might succeed, leading either to blackmail regarding European leadership or to an actual, full-scale war. We would then be witnessing a collapse of the regional balance in Eastern Europe. That balance is already barely holding together; Ukraine is still fighting. Its potential collapse would lead to fundamental, structural changes in Europe’s security system and in the entire global system.

Let us remember that the Chinese are watching all of this, comparing Ukraine to Taiwan. They see that the West lacks the resilience to truly defend its “red lines” and that deterrence does not have any real significance.

During the Biden administration, deterrence failed on three occasions. The first time was at the beginning of 2022, when the Americans declassified a large amount of secret data to send a message to the Russians: “Don’t do that!” And what did the Russians do? They entered Ukraine. The second example was the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023. We are talking about an attack on America’s closest ally—with Iran’s support and with the approval of Russia and China. The final example is the Iranian missile attack on Israel (despite President Biden’s warnings). Instead of responding by striking the launch sites from which the missiles were fired, the United States only shot at the missiles themselves. This brings us back to what I mentioned during our last conversation – we are shooting arrows, not archers. What we are communicating is a lack of courage and determination. Unfortunately, we must be aware that rebuilding deterrence – from a historical perspective – is extremely difficult to achieve without war.

There is a simple failure today to recognize that wars have consequences. In 1991, the Soviets lost the Cold War, and the United States had an obligation to restructure the region in a way that supported the interests of both the USA and democratic states. All of this was accomplished – as evidenced by the expansion of NATO and the European Union. After that 1991, we underwent a geostrategic and political restructuring, but unfortunately without the necessary military support. In that last aspect, we acted quite the opposite: Europe disarmed while the United States started chasing jihadists in the mountains after September 11. This is why today we see appeasement and Russian revisionism. A vacuum has formed in supporting a new security architecture, as politicians and various experts spouted drivel about the ‘end of history’ and a ‘peace dividend.’

It is very difficult to admit, but it is in Europe’s vital interest to maintain relations with the USA.

Speaking of today’s American administration, one cannot avoid comparing it to the previous presidency. At the end of last year, during our last conversation, you mentioned that President Biden’s mistake was his lack of a vision of victory regarding Ukraine. In one of your recent articles, you wrote that Trump’s policy is a complete renunciation of the policy pursued by his predecessor. The question then arises: in your opinion, does Donald Trump have such a vision of victory?

That’s number one question here. Looking at what is happening in American domestic politics – I mean the dismantling of the so-called “deep state,” agencies like USAID, as well as personnel and budget cuts, etc. These are cuts that should have been made a long time ago. The bureaucratic bloat in the American administration is a fact, and it has resulted in good ideas being mixed with absurd ones. I have no objection to this process, but I do have concerns about how it is being done. We are dismantling, yet the question arises as to what is going to replace the existing solutions? Let us remember that in a modern, contemporary state, certain institutions must continue to function.

When it comes to foreign affairs, we ask the same question: what is the vision for the system that is meant to replace what Biden was doing? What is the vision of victory? We hear from the president that he wants to end this war. The question is, why? Donald Trump offers a humanitarian argument about stopping the bloodshed, etc. That is, of course, very important, but I believe that, in reality, Ukraine “falls out of Trump’s game” because he considers it a losing proposition created by the previous administration.

In my view, his vision is to freeze this conflict, and what Russia has already achieved is a breaking out of isolation, which occurred during the February meeting in Riyadh. That was a great success for Putin. The fact that neither Europeans nor anyone from Ukraine were present gave Russia a huge advantage. The Russians have managed to break free from isolation, and at the same time, let us note that at this moment there is no clear data regarding what is expected from them.

Of course, in all of this, the Russians could “overbid.” They might do so if they continue to stick to the narrative that they are not halting their military operations or that they do not agree to any deterrent and stabilizing forces in Ukraine. Trump might take this personally and feel deceived and offended by Putin.

Right now, we are witnessing a dramatic situation in which it seems that everything is lost; yet, look at how unpredictably Donald Trump negotiates. I believe there is a method to his madness. Thus, if the Russians “overbid,” everything could reverse. I encourage Europeans to expect many more twists and to be prepared for the unpredictable.

Staying on the subject of Russian isolation – can we say that what the American administration is doing now is another 21st-century attempt at a reset with Russia?

In fact, pulling Russia out of isolation has already led to a reset of relations between the United States and Russia. I, however, think this is not about a “reset”. The Donald Trump administration will try to do a Reverse Kissinger. This is a different way of thinking than in 2012, when Barack Obama announced a plan called the Pivot to Asia (org.), from which they quickly withdrew and also announced a reset with Russia. At that time a cohort of analysts emerged who believed that there was a possibility of finding a strategic solution regarding the conflict with China that would free up American resources for the Indo-Pacific theater without increasing defence spending.

As I have written, that way of thinking is mistaken. It is a way of thinking that speaks of disaggregation—that is, separating the Pacific from the Atlantic and saying that they are two separate theaters and that one can operate in one without incurring costs in the other. It is about the idea that one can withdraw from the Atlantic partially or completely while still maintaining the USA’s dominant position and managing the Pacific.

The loss of credibility in Europe and the disintegration of NATO will lead to the loss of credibility in the Pacific.
Dr Andrew Michta

There is a reason why the United States got involved in the conflict in Europe during both world wars (Europe First). Let us note that the Americans did so despite the fact that the Japanese attacked them not in the Atlantic, but in the Pacific. The USA’s decision that “Europe is first” was made because the fundamental assumption of American geopolitical thinking is that, living in the Western Hemisphere, the United States cannot allow itself to be dominated by a single power from Europe and Asia, as that would confine it to that hemisphere. That is the strategic DNA of the United States, since it is a continental island. The United States is blessed with an extremely secure neighborhood…

It is, moreover, interesting how Donald Trump reacted to Volodymyr Zelensky’s words that the perspective of the United States is different, because “an ocean that provides security separates you.” It was a flashpoint that infuriated the American president…

Zelensky precisely said, “An ocean separates you, but you will learn what we are going through…”; In doing so, he challenged the American security mechanism which asserts that the United States enjoys an exceptionally secure location and that wars, in principle, are not fought on the American continent. Without this, one cannot understand why September 11 was such a turning point for the United States. A group of bandits hijacked several airplanes—one of the most basic means of transport for Americans—and turned those airliners into missiles. It was a blow to the core of the idea that the “homeland” is secure. In my opinion, Zelensky does not understand this. Oceans are the internal communication routes of American power projection.

Returning to your question about a potential “reset” – it has already largely taken place in the sense that Russia has broken out of isolation. But let us remember that this is not a reset meaning that from now on we will tell each other, “Let’s love one another and remain friends.” The actions of the American administration in this situation are very transactional, i.e. it is attempting to tear apart the Chinese-Russian alliance.

I personally believe that this is a way of thinking that has very little chance of success. The Russians will continue to try to expand their influence in Europe, and the Chinese will support them, because they are interested in vassalizing Russia.

Trump thinks about escalation differently than Biden. Biden was paralyzed by vertical escalation. Trump’s concern is rather that, for him, Ukraine is a losing proposition. He believes that investing in it without securing assets (hence the talks about rare earth minerals) will only drain the resources of the United States without any chance of a geopolitical victory.

In conclusion—one sentence: if we allow Ukraine to collapse, it will have very serious negative consequences for the security of the entire region.