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Geopolitics

Migration Strategy for 2025-2030 in Poland: What’s Next?

Photo. Straż Graniczna

As indicated by the legislator, the migration strategy for 2025-2030 redefines Poland’s approach to migration management, emphasizing more restrictive regulations. The adopted solutions aim to limit the influx of undesirable individuals, which is crucial in light of the increasing dynamics of migration flows and the rising number of migrants, particularly from Ukraine. The core idea is to regain control and ensure security. The priorities of the strategy are well-illustrated and commendable. However, implementation remains a key issue, and many doubts arise in this regard.

The 2025-2030 migration strategy is available online, and anyone can familiarize themselves with it. It is a much-needed document that was undoubtedly missing in previous years. It highlights the key elements in the development of Polish immigration policy, which in the past was mainly emigration-focused. The strategy outlines the main goals, which will serve as guidelines during the implementation phases, divided into two periods: 2025–2027 and 2028–2030.

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Key Assumptions of the Strategy

  1. Security as a Priority: Migration will be strictly regulated, controlling the purpose of arrival, the scale of influx, and the countries of origin of foreigners.
  2. Access to Territory: The strategy proposes a transparent visa policy based on a selective approach to migration, with clear rules for the entry and stay of foreigners for economic and educational purposes. Consular autonomy in decision-making will be strengthened.
  3. Access to National and International Protection: Changes will be introduced in asylum procedures to prevent their misuse in hybrid operations, while considering the humanitarian aspect of situations. The strategy also allows for the temporary suspension of asylum applications, with parliamentary oversight mechanisms and protection for vulnerable groups.
  4. Access to the Labour Market: The document proposes that foreigners should fill gaps in deficit occupations, while preventing the creation of new challenges for the labour market. The strategy takes into account the risks of fraudulent work applications, which could be used for illegal entry into Poland and the Schengen Area.
  5. Educational Migration: The strategy regulates foreigners' access to the Polish education system, preventing its use solely for obtaining legal residence. Universities will be able to conduct transparent internationalization processes.
  6. Immigrant Integration: For the first time in Polish policy, principles of immigrant integration are described, aimed at supporting their inclusion into Polish society while maintaining social cohesion. Respect for Polish norms and values by immigrants will be crucial.
  7. Citizenship and Repatriation: The strategy addresses the rules for foreigners acquiring Polish citizenship and the repatriation of people of Polish descent. It also references the "Polish Card" program.
  8. Polish Diaspora: Principles of cooperation with the Polish diaspora and entities representing Polish Community Abroad are outlined. The government will support the return of Polish migrants to their homeland.

According to its authors, the implementation of this strategy aims to create a transparent and secure immigration system that will be fully controlled by state institutions, ensuring both protection and development for Polish citizens and legal immigrants alike.

Great things require great work. What is most important still lies ahead

While most of the assumptions in the strategy should be agreed upon, as there was no such document before, it is important to point out where gaps still exist. Looking to the migration policies of partners in the European Union is not the best solution. In fact, it often demonstrates hownot to develop immigrant integration structures.

French President Emmanuel Macron acknowledged that part of the responsibility for terrorism in France lies with the country itself. He noted that the French state contributed to creating conditions conducive to Islamic separatism, particularly in marginalized areas or dangerous districts. Macron emphasized that these areas, shaped by social and economic inequalities and France’s unresolved colonial history, have become breeding grounds for extremism. He stated that solving this problem requires long-term investments in education, housing, and infrastructure. These remarks were made almost five years ago. Has France improved? No. The situation has worsened even more in Germany and Italy. Poland cannot make these same mistakes.

Immigration to Poland is just the beginning. It is the prelude to any activity by the entire state apparatus. The real engagement of dozens of entities starts when a border is crossed (legally or illegally) and when a decision is made regarding asylum or residence. This triggers subsequent events such as decisions on expulsion and deportation. However, if a person has the right to remain in Poland, it means a significant responsibility lies on our side.

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The discussed strategy explicitly states: „Implementing the assumptions requires creating a new migration management system that ensures coherence of action and addresses the current fragmented and multi-level division of competences. The practical implementation of migration policy must be the responsibility of the government, with the particular involvement of the Head of the Office for Foreigners, Voivodeships, and the Border Guard. At the same time, local governments, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, and social organizations play a key role in integration policy. Ultimately, migration policy is implemented at all levels of public administration, taking into account the division of competences, tasks, and responsibilities between them. Decisions in migration policy are made through social dialogue, which the central administration is obliged to initiate.” The designation of responsibilities for specific entities is commendable, but it still does not define the new tasks that these entities will undertake. There is growing concern that they have not enforced these tasks in the past at all. If these are new initiatives, it can be assumed that we are facing a series of trainings across the country—from the central to local government levels.

This is an extensive range of actions, where key issues are social, educational, cultural, religious, security, and political (including international relations). Even people who are culturally and geographically close should be monitored in terms of integration. Language learning, avoiding isolation on the streets or in districts populated by migrants from specific countries, working or studying in the host country, respecting the prevailing rules, and openness to strengthening good relations between the country of origin and the country of arrival are essential. Observation, contact, and conclusions are also tasks for those involved in the „body” of the migration strategy. Since it is planned for the years 2025–2030, I believe preparations and training for responsible individuals should begin now.

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The state administration is obligated to verify and respond. If it supports the employment process, it should also consider, for example, whether the person receiving financial assistance actually resides in Poland and uses it appropriately. The enormity of responsibilities in accepting people, particularly from Africa and the Middle East, is overwhelming.

The proposed strategy only hints at an idea, not a description of the process.

It is noted that „Poland will not apply any assimilation instruments in its integration policy, recognizing that integration is a multi-stage, two-way process based on building proper relationships between immigrants and the society of the host state. The goal of integration policy is to incorporate foreigners into society, allowing for the full utilization of their potential.”

It should be emphasized that assimilation means immigrants fully adapt to the culture and norms of the host society, often giving up their own traditions and cultural identity. It is expected that they fully adopt the customs of the country they have come to. Integration, on the other hand, assumes that immigrants can maintain their cultural identity while simultaneously engaging with the host society. This process is based on mutual respect and coexistence of different cultures. This distinction is also important in the context of Polish strategy.

The document also states: „The implementation of migration policy directions and goals will not succeed without the creation of a comprehensive, multi-level integration policy that includes incorporating foreigners into Polish society and avoiding mistakes made in the past by other countries.” Thus, as can be seen from the example of incoming Ukrainian citizens, only an integration policy will be implemented.

A significant advantage, at the planning stage, is the idea of cooperation with all entities involved in the creation and implementation of migration policy. The Inter-ministerial Migration Team will monitor and evaluate the progress of implementing this Strategy on an ongoing basis to conduct a comprehensive mid-term review of its implementation by the end of 2027. A visible issue is the matter of implementation. The initiative is set to be in operation in just two months. This seems entirely impossible given the number of general statements.

A remedy for this strategy could be the establishment of a separate central-level institution with broad competences in creating and implementing migration policy. It should be built based on the current Office for Foreigners. This means its organization should start now. The year 2027—or rather its end—will be far too late. Representatives responsible for various levels of public administration should begin consultations as soon as possible. This includes representatives from border areas (who face the influx of migrants), security services (with an emphasis on the Border Guard), including Frontex, selected ministries, as well as non-governmental organizations and experts.

One particularly interesting assumption is: „In the event of a threat to state destabilization due to the influx of immigrants, it should be possible to temporarily and geographically suspend the right to accept asylum applications.” Here, the question arises as to how to determine when this influx is a threat. There are already proposals to suspend asylum. With dozens of (recorded) attempts to cross our border and attacks on Polish officers and soldiers, it seems like this is the best moment.

In the context of this „threat”—what constitutes a threat? Is it the number of people or the actions they take? Additionally, there is a lack of information on how to regulate illegal migration, given the open borders within the Schengen Area. It’s also worth considering Norway’s approach and its suspension of asylum for Ukrainian citizens. We must evaluate Poland’s stance on those arriving from the eastern border and whether we have a detailed integration plan for the next two decades. When assessing how people from our region settle in Poland, it is essential to look more broadly—globally. This challenge, where the cultural, religious, and social mosaic will be a significant burden, must be addressed. Geographical migration directions should be considered simultaneously; that is, people from different regions settling in Poland.

We are Waiting

All of Poland, including citizens living abroad, are eagerly waiting for the implementation of the strategy. It is difficult to either praise or criticize a document that only outlines planned actions. Of course, the assumptions are very good. However, based on our experience with migration, we are aware that what truly matters are the results, the legislation that is actually adopted, and, most importantly, the restrictions that are enforced.

It must be emphasized rather strongly that the primary focus is Poland’s national interest. Warsaw must act in its own favor and present its vision on the international stage. Poland’s voice must resonate within the European Union, which, territorially, cannot stretch any further. There is simply no capacity to accommodate thousands more people crossing the Mediterranean Sea each day. The influx is not stopping, and detention centres (such as Italy’s in Albania, the UK’s in Rwanda, the Netherlands« in Uganda, or France’s in Ivory Coast) are not effective solutions. Assistance should be provided „there” (in countries of origin/regions), not „here.” Any other methodology will only lead to a larger influx of people.

It is logical that those fleeing war will seek safe places, especially where there are prospects for a better life. The issue, however, goes deeper, as there is an increasing number of economic migrants. Currently, Africa has the youngest population in the world, with around 63% of its inhabitants under the age of 25 (in the Sahel, it’s 65%). This makes the continent stand out globally, as it constitutes a significant portion of the world’s young population. It is estimated that by 2030, 75% of Africa’s population will be under 35. Africa is experiencing more conflicts, and thousands of people will continue to head toward Europe. In addition, there are the regions of the Middle East and South Asia.

The EU must engage with the governments of countries in crisis to indicate that sanctions will be imposed if these governments do not attempt to curb migration toward Europe or if they continue to encourage it. Financial offers to war-torn Libya or authoritarian Tunisia may not be enough.

EU policy must clearly signal that it will not accept additional individuals who do not meet formal requirements. This should discourage migrants, aware of the difficulty in crossing borders and being accepted, from attempting to come to Europe. One proposal is to monitor verification points on the African continent itself, in countries of the Maghreb or at embassies across the continent.

Additionally, in extreme situations of escalating conflict between two countries, alongside the immediate deployment of security forces, their efforts must be reinforced by military components. Such a situation could occur if Poland, Finland, or the Baltic states—forming NATO’s eastern flank—become targets of hybrid actions involving migrants by Belarus or Russia.

The concept of „demographic weaponry” has been raised in Poland for years. In today’s world, using populations to achieve political goals has become common for authoritarian governments, leading to terms such as „demographic weapon” and „hybrid attack.” These tactics manifest in the creation of artificial migration flows to pressure another entity or country.

Considering the migration crisis of 2015, the continuous influx of migrants to Europe, and their use as a hybrid weapon in 2021, we can expect further waves of migration from Africa and the Middle East in the coming years, potentially supported by Russia or Belarus. These threats will be driven by worsening situations caused by conflicts, terrorism, and authoritarian regimes on other continents, as well as the exploitation of migrants to bolster the positions of specific governments. The phenomenon of shifting large numbers of people to a neighboring country to destabilize it and exploit its resources is a recurring tactic that will continue into the future.

Starting additional conversations about migration is crucial. There is no greater challenge facing the world than the movement of populations. We see this issue in every corner of the globe. The sooner a migration policy is implemented that prioritizes Poland and its citizens, the better the future we will ensure for the next generations. The ability to travel, work, and study across the world is a remarkable opportunity. However, everything has its limits, especially when state security is at risk. We must remember that borders are not walls that enclose Poland but rather lines that help protect our values and identity. It is time to regain control and ensure security.

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